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ABSTRACT 
Oil and gas pipelines are safe and economic to petroleum products transportation. 
Nevertheless, enormous risk influencing factors are threatening the safety of these 
pipelines during the planning, construction and operations stages of these projects. 
Risk analysis in these projects is hindered by the inaccurate data about the 
probability and severity levels of the risk influencing factors. This problem is 
exacerbated further in troubled and developing countries, where the 
documentations and records are not at the best conditions. This study aims to 
identify and analyze potential risk influencing factors using a more integrated risk 
analysis framework. In this framework, the critical risk influencing factors and 
some of applied risk mitigation methods were identified based on a comprehensive 
review of pipelines projects worldwide. The impact of the identified factors and the 
effectiveness of mitigation methods were evaluated based on an industry-wide 
questionnaire survey in Iraq. A Computer-Based Risk Analysis Model (CBRAM) 
was designed to analyze the risk influencing factors using a fuzzy logic theory to 
consider any uncertainty that is associated with stakeholders’ judgments and data 
scarcity. The CBRAM has confirmed the most critical risk influencing factors, 
which this study has explained the effective methods to manage them. 
Keywords- Oil and Gas Pipelines; Risk Analysis; Risk Analysis Framework; Risk 
Mitigation Methods; Fuzzy Inference System; and Computer –Based Risk Analysis Model 
1. Introduction 
Oil and Gas Pipelines (OGPs) are economic and safe to transport the petroleum products. 
As Hopkins et al. [1] stated that the OGPs are 1.19 times cheaper than ships, 5.29 times 
cheaper than rail and trucks, 40 times cheaper than airplanes, 40 times safer than railroad 
tank cars and 100 times safer than tank trucks. Nevertheless, several Risk Influencing 
Factors (RIFs) may threaten the safety of these projects during the planning, construction, 
and operational stages including Third-Party Disruption (TPD), corrosion [2], design and 
construction defects, natural hazards, operational errors, and many others [3,4]. TPD 
refers to any external factors that can damage the pipelines [5], which is the major cause 
of OGP failure in European countries as well as in the USA [1]. Mitigating RIFs in OGP 
projects is valuable because it minimizes the massive losses that result from damage to 
the pipelines (e.g. life losses, disturbing the oil export activities, the cost of repairing the 
damaged pipes, the environmental consequences, and so forth). Moreover, it ensures the 
safety of the staff that work on OGP projects and the people who live in the surrounding 
areas. Therefore, the stakeholders in such projects must be aware of the RIFs that can 
damage OGPs. They must also have a robust risk mitigation system that can keep the 
RIFs at the lowest level, as far as possible. 
As Fang & Marle [6] and Peng, et al [7] stated the management of the RIFs starts with 
identifying the RIFs, then analyzing them, responding to them, and, finally, control them. 
However, the existing Risk Analysis Frameworks (RAFs) have the following major and 
minor limitations regarding the identification and the analysis of the RIFs. The major 
limitation is that, it is worthwhile to analyze and rank the RIFs regarding their degree of 
influence on OGP projects considering their probability and severity levels [1] to identify 
the RIFs that require urgent attention. This is because dealing with each RIF as if it is the 
most critical one results in a large waste of resources [8]. However, the existing RAFs are 
not accurate enough to analyze the probability of all types of RIFs, especially TPD which 
is due to the absence of a historical database [7,9]. The minor limitation are: (1) the 
identification and registration of RIFs that may threaten the pipelines must be based on a 
real database and historical records of the pipelines’ failure causes [10]. Hopkins et al [1] 
defined a real database as one that contains records of the pipelines’ design; maps of their 
routes; pipeline fault and accident data; previous inspections and surveillance records; 
operational pressure and pressure test records; pipeline maintenance records; and 
modification records. However, the current RAFs have some limitations due to the 
inaccurate and uncertain information about the RIFs regarding their levels of probability 
and severity [11]. This problem is exacerbated further in troubled and developing 
countries where documentation is not in the best condition. (2) Most of the RAFs are 
mainly considering one or two RIFs at a time, which means they are not applicable to 
manage the safety of the pipelines’ projects elsewhere [12]. (3) It is significant to evaluate 
the Risk Mitigation Methods (RMMs) in relation to their effectiveness in mitigating the 
RIFs. To make effective recommendations to mitigate the RIF in the projects. However, 
the effectives of the RMMs have not been evaluated in the previous studies about 
managing the RIFs in OGPs projects. 
From the foregoing text, an authentic study about managing the RIFs in OGP projects is 
unachievable if the essential data about identifying the RIFs, analyzing them (e.g. their 
probability and severity of the RIFs), and evaluating the RMMs (e.g. a method’s usability 
and effectiveness) are not accurate. These highlighted crucial problems hinder the efforts 
of risk mitigation in OGP projects in troubled and developing countries like Iraq. Hence, 
there is a vital need to help the stakeholders to focus on the most vulnerable segments of 
pipeline safety by employing a holistic risk analysis approach that can overcome the 
highlighted crucial problems. 
Moreover, traditionally the RIFs are ranked based on their values of Risk Index (RI), 
which can be calculated using equation 1 [11, 13, 14]. 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 = 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 × 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑆𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 … (1) 
This method (i.e. equation 1) gives an opportunity to rank the RIFs using the RI, which 
reflect the both of the probability and severity levels of the factors. However, such a 
ranking method might not accurately reflect criticality of the RIFs in OGP projects in Iraq 
for the following two reasons. Firstly and majorly, this equations requires accurate values 
about the probability and severity levels of the RIFs, which are difficult to obtain in the 
case study area “Iraq” because of the limitations that have been explained earlier in the 
paper, see the second paragraph in section 1. Therefore, there is a need to analyze the 
RIFs deepening on their range of probability and severity levels rather than accurate 
values about their probability and severity levels. Secondly, because an RIF with a high 
severity level could still be considered as a critical RIF that needs an urgent attention of 
management. However, the same RIF could not come at the top of the ranking if it had a 
low probability level. This is similar if the probability level of the RIF is high and the 
severity level is low, which is one of the RI method’s limitations. 
Additionally, Iraq after 2003 experienced a high demand for new OGP projects in 
addition to rehabilitating the existing pipelines to meet the requirements of the rapid 
increase in oil exports. However, the inadequacy of managing several RIFs that 
threatened these projects had a negative effect on the country’s oil export activities. For 
example, there was no available or accessible data that could be used to accurately 
identify the RIFs that may affect the OGPs in Iraq. 
The aim of this paper, therefore, is to develop an integrated RAF that follows qualitative 
data analysis approach to identify the RIFs and RMMs associated with OGPs; and 
statistical methodology-based and fuzzy logic theory approaches to analyze the RIFs and 
RMMs in a more accurate way to enhance the safety of OGP projects, particularly in 
trouble countries. 
To overcome the problem of a scarcity of data and a lack of information about the causes 
of pipeline failure and risk mitigation methods, a worldwide, qualitative document 
analyses was carried out to provide a review about OGPs RFs and risk mitigation 
methods, specifically in insecure environments. Nandi et al., [15] found that there are 
many of risk factors are effecting the safety of OGPs in Nigeria. Such as terrorism and 
sabotage attacks; official corruption; thieves; corrosion and lack of protection against it; 
improper inspection and maintenance; weak ability to identify and monitor the risks; 
stakeholders not paying proper attention; lack of proper training, shortage of modern IT 
services; limited warning signs; lack of risk registration; little research on this topic; 
public poverty and education level; operational errors; inadequate risk management; 
natural disasters and weather conditions. Moreover, Rowland, [16] say the exposed 
pipelines and threats to staff are effacing the safety of OGPs in Nigeria. Srivastava & 
Gupta [8] draw a scenario about a terrorism attack that might happened in India and they 
expect risk factors like insecure areas, easy access to pipeline and hacker attacks on the 
operating or control systems might effect OGPs in their country. Other studies added 
more risk factors like lawlessness, low public legal and moral awareness, and vehicular 
accidents [7], improper safety regulations; design, construction and material defects and 
geological risks [17] conflicts over land ownership [18], leakage of sensitive information 
[19], and animal accidents [20]. 
Moreover, the existing RAFs are limited to analyzing only one type or two types of RIFs 
at once. For instance, European countries mainly focus on corrosion and stress-strain risks 
because their pipelines are underground and they are less subject to sabotage risk. USA 
focuses more on the terrorism risk, especially after 9/11, in addition to corrosion because 
the USA uses underground pipelines as well. African countries direct more attention 
toward thefts risks because the stolen products might be sold on the illegal market. In the 
meantime, due to current globally insecure environments, critical infrastructures like 
OGPs are potential targets for saboteurs. Correspondingly, intentional TPD like 
(terrorism, sabotage and theft) has been recognized as one of the most dominant 
mechanisms of OGP failure globally [2,4]. 
Several studies were analyzed to develop the RAF. In Pakistan, Mubin and Mubin [20] 
developed a risk management model to provide recommendations to manage the RIFs in 
gas pipeline projects during the construction stage. In this model, a data bank was created 
to register the RIFs, which were simulated using Monte Carlo simulation. Schwarz et al. 
[16] developed a risk management procedure to evaluate the RIFs to support decision- 
making processes in construction projects. The model started by defining the scope of the 
projects, the criteria of the risk management, and identifying the RIFs. Then, experts’ 
judgments and artificial neural network were applied to analyze the RIFs. These two 
models identified the RIFs based on analyzing documents relating to local projects. El- 
Abbasy et al. [17] developed a framework to predict the conditions of offshore OGPs in 
Qatar. In this study, they employed historical data and artificial neural network to 
priorities the maintenance work for these pipelines. To assess the performance of water 
distribution pipeline network in Qatar and Canada, El-Abbasy et al. [18] carried out 
similar work using fuzzy analytical network. However, none of the reviewed models have 
identified and evaluated RMMs. 
Moving forward in this paper, section 2 provides a detailed review related to identifying 
and classifying the pipeline RIFs and RMMs. The methodology of designing the RAF 
and analyzing the RIFs and RMMs is explained in section 3. Section 4 shows the results 
of the study and section 5 discusses them. Section 6 highlights the conclusion of the study 
and the recommendations for future work. 
2. Research Methodology 
The development of an integrated RAF is a part of the methodology of this paper to 
mitigate the RIFs. Accordingly, this paper adopts these models to develop a more holistic 
and effective RAF via bridging the highlighted gaps in these models as shown in Figure 
1. 
 
Figure 1: An Integrated Risk Analysis Framework (RAF). 
Following the process of the developed RAF, step 1 was about identifying the associated 
RIFs and RMMs based on the available database(s) and the previous literature. 
Deterministic approach and simulation are the main two ways used to calculate the 
probability of failure. The deterministic approach utilizes the related data to assess the 
probability conditions of RIFs. And the simulation approaches utilizes correlation 
analysis with the age and the conditions of the pipes to assess the probability of failure 
based on the historical records [19]. Risky environments, similar to those in Iraq, require 
further investigations to understand the RIFs and RMMs. These investigations prompted 
the need for step 2, which was about designing a questionnaire survey to collect the 
stakeholders' opinions about the levels of the “probability and severity” of the RIFs and 
the “usability and effectiveness” levels of RMMs as they have real experience of OGP 
issues. 
The uncertainty and the lack of such historical data are the main challenges for managing 
infrastructure projects and collecting supplementary data. Meanwhile, knowledge, and 
analytical or simulation techniques are the most effective way to deal with the uncertainty 
[25]. So, step 3 was about using the findings of steps 1 and 2 as inputs for a Computer- 
Based Risk Analysis Model (CBRAM) that was developed to model the RIFs and RMMs 
using Mamdani algorithm and If-Then rules within the Fuzzy Inference System (FIS) 
toolbox of MATLAB. 
2.1. Step 1: Identifying the Risk Influencing Factors (RIFs) and Risk 
Mitigation Methods (RMMs). 
Extensive investigations were carried out to identify these RIFs in OGP projects within 
different circumstances, firstly worldwide and secondly in countries where OGPs 
suffered similar security problems to those in Iraq. Based on [5,26,27,28], which are the 
stage I of this ongoing research, 30 RIFs and 12 RMMs were identified, as listed in Error! 
Reference source not found. and Table 2 respectively. 
Despite these investigations containing comprehensive and worthwhile information about 
the RIFs based on extensive literature, there was still a lack of data and certainty about 
the hazardous events (e.g. risk probability and severity), especially in areas where there 
are few historical records. Practically, the field of OGP projects is the main source of such 
data rather than the theoretical document analysis. 
2.2. Step 2: Questionnaire Design and Data Sampling 
The survey targeted stakeholders from OGP projects in Iraq, like designers, planners, 
consultants; construction, operators, and maintenance workers; owners, clients, and 
researchers to collect their perceptions about the RIFs and RMMs in their projects. Before 
distributing the survey, a pilot survey was carried out to improve the clarity of the 
questions and test the functionality of the survey [28]. The snowball sampling technique 
for data collection was applied to collect enough respondents to the survey [30]. The 
survey was distributed using an online webpage. The respondents were assured that their 
participations will be analyzed confidentially and anonymously. 
In the survey, a 1 to 5 index range was used to transform the probability and severity of 
the RIFs into a unified point rating system [19]. The probability levels of the RIFs were 
evaluated on a scale [almost certain, likely, possible, unlikely, and rare]. The severity 
levels of the RIFs were evaluated on a scale [catastrophic, major, moderate, minor, and 
negligible]. The usability of the RMMs was evaluated on a scale of [almost certain used, 
likely used, possible used, unlikely used, and rare used]. The effectiveness of the RMMs 
was evaluated on a scale of [extremely effective, very effective, moderately effective, 
slightly effective, and insignificant]. As well as, there were two open-ended questions to 
add more RIFs and RMMs to the working list. The results of analyzing the RIFS and 
RMMs based on the survey are shown in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively. Table 3and 
Table 4 are showing the participants’ demographic information and the reliability level 
of the survey, respectively. 
Table 1: The results of analyzing the based on the survey 
 
RIFs (from the literature) 
[5,26,27,28,29] 
Probability Severity RI (using 
Eq. (1))* 
Rank 
Terrorism & sabotage 3.995 4.490 3.59 1 
Corruption 3.980 4.323 3.44 2 
Low public legal & moral awareness 3.712 4.106 3.02 4 
Insecure areas 3.717 4.192 3.05 3 
Thieves 3.692 4.081 3.01 5 
Corrosion & lack of protection against it 3.687 3.990 2.94 6 
Lack of proper training 3.646 3.859 2.80 11 
Improper safety regulations 3.687 3.960 2.91 7 
Exposed pipelines 3.667 3.949 2.87 8 
Improper inspection & maintenance 3.657 3.899 2.83 10 
Conflicts over land ownership 3.495 3.646 2.57 19 
Shortage of the IT services & modern 
equipment 
3.667 3.924 2.86 9 
Weak ability to identify & monitor the threats 3.631 3.848 2.75 12 
Design, construction & material defects 3.333 3.611 2.48 21 
Lack of historical records about accidents and 
risk registration 
3.566 3.662 2.64 17 
The pipeline is easy to access 3.631 3.773 2.70 13 
Limited warning signs 3.626 3.732 2.68 14 
Little research on this topic 3.621 3.697 2.66 15 
Lawlessness 3.606 3.682 2.65 16 
Stakeholders are not paying proper attention 3.530 3.652 2.59 18 
Public’s poverty & education level 3.449 3.611 2.52 20 
Inadequate risk management methods 3.227 3.505 2.24 23 
Leakage of sensitive information 2.980 3.399 2.09 25 
Threats to staff (kidnap and/or murder) 3.323 3.571 2.35 22 
Operational errors e.g. human error and 
equipment failure 
3.101 3.409 2.19 24 
Geological risks like soil movement and 
landslides 
2.747 3.182 1.75 26 
Natural disasters & weather conditions 2.652 3.066 1.63 27 
Hacker attacks on the operating or control 
system 
3.066 3.066 1.33 29 
Vehicle accidents 2.465 2.970 1.34 28 
Animal accidents 1.894 2.020 0.77 30 
*For example: 𝑅𝐼 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑚 & 𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 = (3.995 × 4.490)/5 = 3.587. 
 
The identified RMMs and results of evaluating their levels of usability and effectiveness 
are presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: The results of the usability and effectiveness of the RMMs. 
 
RMMs (from the literature) [5,26,27,28,29] Usability Effectiveness 
Anti-corrosion such as isolation & cathodic protection 3.652 4.23 
Move to an underground pipeline 3.475 4.07 
Advanced technological & professional remote monitoring 3.616 4.0 
Proper inspection, tests & maintenance 3.768 3.83 
Proper training 4.051 3.79 
Avoid insecure areas 4.247 3.78 
Anti-terrorism design 3.783 3.78 
Avoid registered risks & threats 3.727 3.77 
Protective barriers & perimeter fencing 3.606 3.69 
Government/public cooperation 3.480 3.57 
Warning signs & marker tape above the pipeline 3.278 3.55 
Foot & vehicle patrols 3.677 3.53 
 
 
A wide range of stakeholders was represented in this survey with a total of 198 
respondents, as shown in Table 3. Correct sampling and representing all of the 
stakeholders' categories enhances the results of RIFs analysis and RMMs evaluation. 
Because the whole categories of stakeholders were represented in the survey. 
Table 3: Participants’ demographic information (F is the Frequency). 
 
Occupation F  Experience (year) F  Education F 
Consultant, planner or designer 14 Less than 5 74 Vocational 3 
Member of a construction team 71 5 to 10 67 High school 28 
Operator 41 10 to 15 29 Bachelor’s degree 106 
Owner or client 39 More than 15 28 Master’s or PhD 61 
Researcher or student 33  
 
The Cronbach’s alpha correlation coefficient (α) was calculated to measure the reliability 
level of the survey [36,37]. 0.7 indicates a minimum level of reliability [38], which means 
the reliability level of the questions individually and the whole survey is acceptable as 
shown in Table 4. 
Table 4: The case processing summary of (α) (from SPSS). 
 
Case Processing Summary Valid Valid % α 
The whole questionnaire 198 100 0.910 
The probability question 198 100 0.919 
The severity question 198 100 0.863 
The usability question 198 100 0.867 
The effectiveness question 198 100 0.792 
 
2.3. Step 3: Computer –Bassed Risk Analysis Model (CBRAM) 
The mean of the five-point scale was calculated to find the values of probability and 
severity of the RIFs. The RI values were calculated for each RIF using equation 1. Table 
3 demonstrates analysis results of RIFs. 
As Dai and Li [31] and Yazdani-Chamzini and Zavadskas [32] concluded, uncertainty 
could arise during risk analysis due to data scarcity or incomplete information about the 
RIFs and experts’ judgments about their probability and severity. In the meantime, the 
use of an appropriate risk evaluation tool can support the decision-maker with regard to 
the safe design and operation of an OGP [13, 31,33]. In such a situation, the fuzzy logic 
theory is a useful tool that can be employed to handle risk analysis for many scenarios 
when there are no precise values and sharp boundaries [34]. In comparison with the RI 
method as shown in equation 1, the fuzzy approach is more adaptable in the case when 
there are no accurate values about the probability and severity levels of the RIFs, as it 
uses fuzzy expressions and linguistic labels instead of rigid mathematical rules and 
equations to analyze them [9]. We have designed a CBRAM using MATLAB to analyze 
each one of the RIFs. The results of the survey (which are probability and severity) were 
used as inputs for this model. In accordance with the conventional fuzzy systems, the 
process of analyzing RIFs is achieved over three stages namely, fuzzification, knowledge 
base, and defuzzification, as shown in 




Figure 2: The process flow diagram of Fuzzy Interface System (FIS). 
 
Fuzzification is about providing crisp inputs for the FIS by generating sets of membership 
functions. To generate such crisp inputs, the Min-Max membership function was used in 
this study as explained in Figure 3. Two types of membership functions proposed by the 
Mamdani mathematical algorithm were applied in this paper: Triangular Membership 
Functions (TrMF) (see Figure 4) and Trapezoidal Membership Functions (TlMF) (see 
Figure 5). The difference between the two membership functions is that the TrMF where 
full compliance is only attained at the maximum score of RI; where the TlMF membership 
function has an upper and a lower limit. Which means that the RI score is considered fully 
compliant once it hits the upper limit. 
The Knowledge base is about defining the conditional statements “If-Then rules” to 
control the behavior of the FIS. For example, rule number 1 says, if the probability is VL 
Very High (VH): [3.75 5 5] 
: [2.5 3.5 5] High (H) 
Very Low (VL): [0 0 1.25] 
 
Low (VL) : [0 1.25 2.5] 
 
Moderate (M) : [1.25 2.5 3.75] 
and the severity is VL then the RI is VL. Rule number 6 says, if the probability is L and 
the severity is VL then the RI is L. Rule number 8 says, if the probability is L and the 
severity is M then the RI is M. Rule number 9 says, if the probability is L and the severity 
is H then the RI is M. Rule number 14 says, if the probability is M and the severity is VH 
then the RI is H. Rule number 22 says, if the probability is VH and the severity is VL 
then the RI is M. Finally, the centroid method of defuzzification was used to obtain the 
final outputs (crisp RI) (see Figure 3). 
 




Figure 4: Fuzzy triangular membership functions for (a) Risk Probability, (b) Risk 
Severity, and (c) Risk Index. 
 
Figure 5: Fuzzy trapezoidal membership functions for ((a) Risk Probability, (b) Risk 




Figure 6: (a) Rule viewer, and (b) 3D risk in FIS. 
3. Results 
Table 5 presents the results of CBRAM that was developed using the FIS toolbox in 
MATLAB. The two types of membership functions gave different values of RI without 
affecting the ranking of these RIFs. 
Table 5: The ranking of RIFs using FIS 
 
RIFs RI (TrMF) Rank Rage RI (TlMF) Rank Rage 
Terrorism & sabotage 3.99 1 H 4.38 1 VH 
Corruption 3.87 2 H 4.38 2 VH 
Low public legal & moral awareness 3.80 3 H 4.36 3 VH 
Insecure areas 3.76 4 H 4.34 4 VH 
Thieves 3.75 5 H 4.33 5 VH 
Corrosion & lack of protection against it 3.72 6 H 4.31 6 VH 
Very High (VH): [3.5 4 5 5] 
: [2.5 3 3.5 4] High (H) 
Very Low (VL): [0 0 0.5 1] 
Low (VL) : [0.5 1 1.5 2] 
 
Moderate (M) : [1.5 2 2.5 3] 
Lack of proper training 3.71 7 H 4.29 7 VH 
Improper safety regulations 3.70 8 H 4.20 8 VH 
Exposed pipelines 3.70 9 H 4.15 9 VH 
Improper inspection & maintenance 3.69 10 H 4.13 10 VH 
Conflicts over land ownership 3.68 11 H 4.04 11 VH 
Shortage of the IT services & modern 
equipment 
3.68 12 H 4.01 12 VH 
Weak ability to identify & monitor the threats 3.67 13 H 3.87 13 H 
Design, construction & material defects 3.64 14 H 3.78 14 H 
Lack of historical records about accidents and 
risk registration 
3.60 15 H 3.72 15 H 
The pipeline is easy to access 3.57 16 H 3.67 16 H 
Limited warning signs 3.56 17 H 3.65 17 H 
Little research on this topic 3.55 18 H 3.63 18 H 
Lawlessness 3.54 19 H 3.61 19 H 
Stakeholders are not paying proper attention 3.51 20 H 3.54 20 H 
Public’s poverty & education level 3.49 21 H 3.52 21 H 
Inadequate risk management methods 3.48 22 H 3.52 22 H 
Leakage of sensitive information 3.38 23 H 3.28 23 H 
Threats to staff (kidnap and/or murder) 3.35 24 H 3.25 24 H 
Operational errors e.g. human error and 
equipment failure 
3.30 25 H 3.25 25 H 
Geological risks like soil movement and 
landslides 
3.17 26 H 3.25 26 H 
Natural disasters & weather conditions 3.10 27 H 3.25 27 H 
Hacker attacks on the operating or control 
system 
3.03 28 H 3.18 28 H 
Vehicle accidents 2.80 29 M 2.68 29 M 
Animal accidents 1.95 30 L 2.50 30 M 
4. Discussion and Limitations 
OGPs are a safe mode by which to transport petroleum products as long as the 
stakeholders are following the design codes; inspecting and maintaining the pipes 
properly during service; and adopting an adequate risk management system to mitigate 
the RIFs. The existing RAFs cannot effectively manage the RIFs in OGP projects in 
troubles countries due to the fact that these methods cannot accurately calculate the 
probability of the RIFs, especially TPD risks because there is no real data available about 
such risk yet. The lack of information about the RIFs and RMMs and the inaccuracy of 
the assessment of the RIFs will result in an uncertain evaluation of OGP risks. In other 
words, the uncertainty is one of the major problems in risk assessment, and makes risk 
analysis a more complicated task. Therefore, there is an urgent need for an accurate 
evaluation of OGP RIFs, particularly the problem of TPD, because these factors have not 
been accurately evaluated. Therefore, the applied RAFs in the other countries are not 
applicable in Iraq or other countries in a similar situation, where the OGP network is 
aboveground and they are subject to all of the mentioned risks. 
The literature review findings were a list of RIFs and a list of RMMs associated with 
OGP projects in different countries across the world, such findings could help to 
overcome the problem of data scarcity about RIFs. By collecting the required information 
about the RIFs and RMMs from various trusted sources like the stakeholders, the 
completed surveys will provide real information to guide future actions relating to OGP 
risk management. However, this method depends on the stakeholders’ acceptance and 
willingness to cooperate with the authors, which is one of its main advantages. The 
method of collecting stakeholders' perceptions could reduce the time and cost of 
investigations; increase their awareness and provide the opportunity to educate them; and 
provide an opportunity to meet those who are responsible for risk management. 
Both the probability and severity level of the RIFs were calculated based on a 
questionnaire survey. To overcome the uncertainty about ranking the RIFs, they have 
been assessed by using a CBRAM that was conducted using fuzzy logic theory. The 
ranking of the RIFs based on the results of the survey shows that sabotage, official 
corruption, lawlessness, insecure areas, and thieves are the most critical RIFs. In contrast, 
it was found that the RIFs with the lowest impact on the projects are geological RIFs, 
natural disasters and weather conditions, hacker attacks on the systems, and vehicles and 
animals accidents. Ranking the RIFs based on the results of FIS shows that there was no 
change for the 1st, 2nd, 5th, 6th, 10th, 26th, 27th and 30th RIFs. FIS classified the RIFs by sets 
of ranges: very low, low, moderate, high, and very high (see Figure 4 and Figure 5), which 
helps to rank the RIFs by their ranges of risk rather than uncertain values of RI. The bold 
text in Error! Reference source not found. shows the difference between risk ranges 
for these two membership functions. FIS provides a powerful surface viewer tool which 
presents the ranking of the RIFs in a 3D risk matrix rather than in tabular view, which 
helps to view the RIFs by their zones of influence on certain pipeline projects, as shown 
in Figure 6. 
The survey has highlighted some of the RFs that might be unique in OGP projects in Iraq, 
as they have not been mentioned in the past studies. For example, pumping more than 
one type of petroleum product and pumping crude oil from different fields in the same 
pipe, and the salts and metals contents in the transported products, which cause internal 
corrosion for the pipes. In addition to the other RFs like, not taking the future urban 
planning into account, which might cause conflate about the land ownership in the future. 
The external oil spots that negatively affect the pipes, which cause external corrosion for 
the pipes and maintenance difficulties. Poor quality of the pipes and the using the pipes 
that older than the design age. 
Based on the survey results, anti-corrosion measures such as isolation and cathodic 
protection were rated as effective RMMs. Corrosion could be protected by providing the 
pipelines with an external coating, using isolation layers, a cathodic protected system, or 
a combination of these methods. However, these methods are not perfect. Therefore, the 
condition of the coating, the isolation layers, and the system of cathodic protection must 
be periodically checked for any issues [1]. The main disadvantage of this method is the 
added cost to the projects and it might slowdown pipeline construction and installation 
processes as certain protections need to be applied. 
Regular risk monitoring and surveys by using advanced technological and professional 
remote monitoring (e.g. aerial and satellite surveillance, remotely controlled vehicles, 
Global Positioning System (GPS), and smart camera systems) can help to investigate any 
unauthorized activities in OGP project zones like terrorism, sabotage, thievery, illegal 
excavation, and construction activities near to the pipeline. Using these methods carry 
some advantages, for example, surveying a large network of pipelines in a short period 
of time. The presence of these methods could serve as a deterrent against intentional TPD, 
and provide quick risk prediction and alerts. These methods also enable photographs of 
pipelines to be shared between the project partners. However, they also have 
disadvantages including high capital investment for equipment, machinery, operational 
costs, and additional training for personnel on new software. 
Based on the survey results, foot and vehicle patrols are not effective RMMs as they are 
time-consuming, do not cover large areas of the OGP network, and need to be carried out 
at frequent intervals to be effective. That said, this method has some advantages such as 
requiring a moderate capital investment for equipment and machinery, and it is effective 
against intentional or unintentional TPD like (landslides, foundation collapse, illegal 
building, blast construction, live ground loads, earthquakes, floods, operational errors, 
control system failures, road construction, farming and drilling, etc) during inspection 
periods. 
Proper operational practices, inspections, and maintenance reduce operative RIFs and 
mechanical failure for the pipeline. Most operators in OGP projects control operational 
RIFs by limiting the operational stress (operating pressure), and following the regulations 
and codes. However, Hopkins et al. [1] noticed some problems with such a procedure: (i) 
the regulations and codes are different in different areas and companies; therefore, they 
are not applicable to OGPs everywhere. (ii) this produce might potentially miss new RIFs 
if RIF identification and registration are not up to date; and (iii) this procedure creates an 
inflexible practice of risk analysis that restricts the stakeholders in applying new methods 
of identifying and mitigating the RIFs. 
The landowners and construction workers should monitor pipelines in their areas to avoid 
carrying out farming or construction work that could damage the pipes. Providing 
communication facilities for the local population like emergency contact (emails and 
phone numbers) and phone lines; mailboxes, and so forth) could help people to report any 
threat to a pipeline. 
Some of the RMMs have been added to this paper after analyzing the percipients’ 
comments on the survey. The RMMs are (1) expand the protection zones along with the 
pipelines and remove the random buildings and unauthorized actives nearby the pipeline. 
(2) Use the rivers and lakes to extend the pipelines in the insecure areas despite the 
construction cost and the risk of corrosion. (3) Pump only one type of product in the 
pipeline and use a different pipeline for each oil field. (4) Use optimizers and remove the 
salts and metals before pumping the petroleum products. 
Finally, the developed RAF cannot link the RIFs or draw scenarios of failures to calculate 
the consequences of any hazardous event. In addition, it does not provide a decision 
support tool that has an automated system to analyze the information (e.g. RIFs, Risk 
Probability, Risk Severity, RMMs and the effectiveness of RMMs). 
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
Risk management cannot protect pipelines from all RIFs. Meanwhile, it should recognize 
the best way to mitigate the RIFs. The developed RAF provides a comprehensive and 
systematic approach to OGP risk management, specifically for organizations that have 
just begun to mitigate OGP RIFs more effectively. 
The results of the questionnaire survey were used to provide real input for a CBRAM to 
analyze the RIFs and RMMs by using the FIS toolbox in MATLAB. Using fuzzy logic 
in the process of the risk assessment remedies the problems of the traditional approaches 
to risk management. 
Iraq needs to overcome many formidable challenges and RIFs that are obstructing the 
OGP system and the development of new projects. While various problems and risks were 
found to be causes of pipeline failure, TPD is recognized as one of the most prevalent 
causes of OGP failure in Iraq. Assessing the RIFs using FIS shows the range of the risk 
is from low to high (by using TrMF), and from moderate to very high (by using TlMF), 
and no risk was ranked as very low in either of these two functions. The CBRAM shows 
that terrorism, official corruption, insecure areas, and lawlessness are the most critical 
RIFs. The range of the RIFs reflects the fact that the critical RIFs in OGPs in Iraq are the 
safety and security RIFs, which could threaten these projects during their planning and 
design, construction, and operation stages. This means managing the RIFs in OGP 
projects is not limited to one project stage. Therefore, different risk mitigation methods 
were suggested to mitigate the RIFs. Also the survey results showed that explicit attention 
needs to be paid to find out exactly what motivates intentional TPD. At the same time, 
the results revealed that the anti-corrosion efforts are the most effective RMMs, and the 
stakeholders who participated in this research stated that the underground OGPs are safer 
than the aboveground ones in relation to their susceptibility to the RIFs. This means the 
stakeholders assumed that the construction and geological RIFs that result from moving 
the pipelines underground have less influence compared to the TPD that results from 
having exposed pipelines. 
In this paper, a new database has been generated to store real information about RIF 
identification, risk analysis, and RMM evaluation to be used for risk management actions 
and by future researchers. The findings and recommendations of this paper are suitable 
for and applicable to manage OGP RIFs in Iraq and many other countries with similar 
situations. 
The Stage III of this study (the future work) is to analyze the comments of the participants 
(from the open-ended questions in the survey) to add more RIFs and RMMs to the 
working list. Additionally we will compare the influence of the RIFs using Analytic 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) to provide more verified ranking of the RIFs. Also, to estimate 
the consequence the hazardous events we will use a neural network analysis tool to draw 
some pipe failure scenarios. Analyzing the cost-effects that result from applying the 
RMMs in OGP projects will be done by conducting some interviews with experts in these 
projects. As well as, one of the decision support tool that can analyze the inputs (e.g. 
RIFs, Risk Probability, Risk Severity, RMMs, the effectiveness of RMMs and the cost) 
will be developed to help the stakeholders during the decision-making process tool to 
choose safe routes for the pipelines and the effective RMMs. Moreover, we would like to 
pay attention to the fact that fuzzy logic based expert system applies an imprecise terms 
that could lead to poor performance in many situations, where identifying risk level of 
OGPs stations includes many overlapping variables changing over time. This assesses 
risk level in such big projects not really and can affect decision-making as well as the 
validity and reliability of decisions made by such systems. Consequently, we aim to take 
a step forward and consider sophisticated intelligent approaches to identify risk levels of 
such big project. In our upcoming study that will be available online soon, we are 
applying set of machine-learning methods for the same purpose. The final results of this 
ongoing research will be conducted with some interviews with experts to analyze the 
cost-effects that result from applying the RMMs in OGP projects. This research will be 
applied on real case study at the final stage of it. Over and above, choosing the pipelines’ 
routes accurately during the planning and design stage avoid to the insecure, high 
population, traffic, natural disasters, and animals areas could minimize the RFs that 
results from such areas. Therefore, design a route analyses to choose safe routes for the 
new pipelines projects is a part of the future work of this study, Such a tool will be 
considers in another publication, which will deliver stage IV of the study. 
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